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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiffs Colleen Reilly and Becky Biter appeal the District Court’s denial of their 
motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a Harrisburg 
ordinance that restricts certain types of expression within twenty feet of health care 
facilities on the ground that it violates the First Amendment.  Consistent with our recent 
decision in Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh (Bruni II), No. 18-1084, slip op. (3d Cir. 2019), we 
will affirm.   
I. Background1 
In November 2012, Harrisburg (the “City”) adopted Ordinance No. 12-2012, 
codified as Harrisburg Code Chapter 3-371 (the “Ordinance”).  It states, in relevant part: 
No person or persons shall knowingly congregate, patrol, 
picket or demonstrate in a zone extending 20 feet from any 
portion of an entrance to, exit from, or driveway of a health 
care facility. 
 
Harrisburg, Pa., Code § 3-371.4 (2012); JA 164.  The city council also ratified a preamble 
that set forth “[f]indings” and the “purpose” of the Ordinance, which it articulated as 
“ensur[ing] that patients have unimpeded access to medical services while protecting the 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 Because we write primarily for the parties, we include only those facts and 
elements of the procedural history necessary to resolve this appeal and discuss the facts in 
greater detail in the context of our analysis below.  
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First Amendment rights of demonstrators to communicate their message.”  Harrisburg, 
Pa., Code § 3-371.2; JA 163–64.  Harrisburg adopted the Ordinance following a city 
council hearing during which the council heard testimony about problems that were 
occurring outside of the city’s two reproductive health facilities, including:  
[T]respassing on private property, blocking the driveway 
entrance to [the] health care center, photographing or 
videotaping staff at close range, documenting license plate 
numbers of staff and patients . . . , yelling harassing and 
offensive words . . . including threat[s] . . . , following the staff 
to continue harassment . . . , pounding on the front window of 
the health center entrance to harass volunteers and those . . . 
seeking care, [and] standing on private property to photograph 
employees through office windows. 
JA 132.  
 Plaintiffs attest that they wish to engage within the zone in “sidewalk counseling,” 
which they define as “peaceful . . . one-on-one conversations . . . , prayer[,]” and 
leafletting through which they attempt to dissuade patients from obtaining an abortion.2  
JA 65.  They contend that their “sidewalk counseling and leafletting approach can only 
be communicated through close, caring, and personal conversations,” and the buffer 
zones created by the Ordinance significantly hinder their ability to effectively 
communicate their message.  JA 78. 
                                                          
2 As in Bruni II, see slip op. at 11 n.6, we will use the term “sidewalk counseling” 
in this opinion in accordance with the meaning given to it by Plaintiffs.    
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 In March 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion to preliminarily enjoin its enforcement on 
First Amendment grounds, which the District Court denied.3  See Reilly v. City of 
Harrisburg, 205 F. Supp. 3d 620, 625, 638–39 (M.D. Pa. 2016).  We reversed and 
remanded, holding that the District Court had improperly applied the preliminary 
injunction standard by shifting the burden of demonstrating narrow tailoring to Plaintiffs; 
however, we did not address the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.  Reilly v. 
City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176–80 (3d Cir. 2017) (Reilly I).   
On remand, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ 
preliminary injunction motion.  Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 336 F. Supp. 3d 451, 456 
(M.D. Pa. 2018).  The Court received numerous pieces of documentary evidence and 
heard substantial testimony about the history of the Ordinance and Harrisburg’s financial 
difficulties at the time of the Ordinance’s adoption, among other topics.  See id.  Based 
on this new evidence and considering the standard for a preliminary injunction as 
clarified in Reilly I, the District Court again denied Plaintiffs’ motion.  Id. at 474.  In 
doing so, the Court concluded that the Ordinance permitted sidewalk counseling. Id. at 
459 n.3, 463–64.  This appeal followed.  
 
                                                          
3 Although not relevant here, Plaintiffs also alleged that the Ordinance violated 
their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and assembly as well as their 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.  See Reilly v. City of 
Harrisburg, 205 F. Supp. 3d 620, 625 (M.D. Pa. 2016).   
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II. Discussion4 
Plaintiffs seek to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance.  To obtain a 
preliminary injunction, an “extraordinary remedy,” Doe ex rel. v. Boyertown Area Sch. 
Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), the moving party must show 
“(1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be 
irreparably injured . . . if relief is not granted,” Reilly I, 858 F.3d at 176 (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted).  If these two “threshold” factors are met, a court then 
considers the remaining two factors—“(3) the possibility of harm to other interested 
persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest”—and 
determines, on balance, whether to grant the requested preliminary relief.  Id. (citation 
omitted).   
At issue here is the first factor: whether Plaintiffs have a sufficient likelihood of 
succeeding on the merits of their constitutional challenge to the Ordinance.5  In support 
of their contention that the Ordinance violates their First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs 
                                                          
 4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a), and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  “When reviewing a district court’s 
[denial] of a preliminary injunction, we review the court’s findings of fact for clear error, 
its conclusions of law de novo, and the ultimate decision . . . for an abuse of discretion.”  
Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted).  Because this is a First Amendment case, however, “we must conduct an 
independent examination of the factual record as a whole.”  Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 
139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
5 As we explained in Riley I, however, in First Amendment cases, “the 
[g]overnment bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of [a statute’s] 
constitutionality.”  858 F.3d at 180 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).   
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make four arguments: (1) “[t]he District Court erred when it sua sponte rewrote the 
Ordinance to permit sidewalk counseling” to save it from constitutional infirmity, 
Appellants’ Br. 23; (2) the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) the 
Ordinance is content based and subject to strict scrutiny; and (4) even if it is considered 
content neutral, the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored and thus does not survive 
intermediate scrutiny.6  As many of Plaintiffs’ arguments are foreclosed by our recent 
decision in Bruni II, we begin there and then address Plaintiffs’ arguments in turn. 
A. Our Decision in Bruni II 
                                                          
6 Plaintiffs also argue that the remaining preliminary injunction factors of 
irreparable injury, public interest, and balance of harms support injunctive relief and that 
we should reassign this case to a different district court judge.  For the reasons explained 
below, we conclude that Plaintiffs do not have a sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the 
merits of their claim—a threshold requirement—and thus do not address these remaining 
factors.  We also decline to exercise our discretion to reassign this case to a different 
district court judge.  See United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 282 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“[R]eassignment is an extraordinary remedy that should seldom be employed.” (citation 
omitted)).  Although we agree that federal courts discussing the significant constitutional 
rights on both sides of this issue should address the parties with appropriate sensitivity 
and respect, including the respect due to the sincere religious beliefs and peaceful 
practices of sidewalk counselors as defined by Plaintiffs, we are not persuaded that the 
few isolated remarks on which Plaintiffs rely to seek recusal indicate bias or partiality on 
the part of the District Judge here.  As a general matter, “judicial remarks during the 
course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, 
or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge,” Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994), and here, while the District Judge appeared at certain 
points to express skepticism about the peacefulness of sidewalk counseling, the record 
before her did reflect instances when persons who called themselves “sidewalk 
counselors” had engaged in loud and aggressive confrontations.  That conduct, however, 
brings such persons outside of Plaintiffs’ definition, and like the Supreme Court in 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, we reject the notion that 
“protestors” and “sidewalk counselors” as Plaintiffs use the term are one and the same.  
519 U.S. 357, 363 (1997).   
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In Bruni II, individuals who identified as sidewalk counselors challenged an 
almost identical ordinance that created a fifteen-foot buffer zone outside the entrance of 
any hospital or healthcare facility in the city of Pittsburgh.  Bruni II, slip op. at 5, 9.  As 
here, the ordinance stated that “[n]o person or persons shall knowingly congregate, 
patrol, picket or demonstrate” in the proscribed zone, id. at 9 (quoting Pittsburgh, Pa., 
Code § 623.04 (2005)), and, although the plaintiffs’ sidewalk counseling consisted only 
of peaceful one-on-one conversations and leafletting, the city of Pittsburgh interpreted the 
ordinance to prohibit the plaintiffs’ actions, Bruni II, slip op. at 12.     
Looking at the plain meaning of the ordinance’s language, we concluded that the 
proscribed activities—congregating, patrolling, picketing, and demonstrating—did not 
encompass the sidewalk counseling in which the plaintiffs engaged.  Id. at 24–26.  As 
such, we found the ordinance “readily susceptible” to a narrowing construction under the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance.  Id. at 21 (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers 
Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)); id. at 24–26.  In the absence of a state court’s 
interpretation to the contrary, we therefore construed the ordinance narrowly not to 
prohibit sidewalk counseling within the zone.  Id. at 22 n.14, 27. 
With the ordinance so interpreted, we rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
ordinance was content based.  Id. at 28.  Because the ordinance did not prohibit sidewalk 
counseling—or any other peaceful one-on-one conversations on any topic or for any 
purpose—we concluded that it neither regulated speech based on subject matter, function, 
or purpose, nor required law enforcement to examine the content of the speech to 
determine if a violation had occurred.  Id. at 26–28.  Indeed, we said, the Supreme Court 
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“has repeatedly considered regulation of [the proscribed] activities to be based on the 
manner in which expressive activity occurs, not its content, and held such regulation 
content neutral.”  Id. at 26 (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 
763–64 (1994); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 721 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 383–85 
(1997); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181–82 (1983)).  Therefore, we concluded 
the ordinance was content neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny.  Bruni II, slip op. 
at 28. 
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the ordinance, as properly interpreted to exclude 
sidewalk counseling, passed muster.  Focusing on the “narrow tailoring” prong, we 
concluded that the ordinance did not “burden substantially more speech than” was 
“necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests” in protecting access to 
pregnancy-related services, ensuring public safety, and eliminating neglect of law 
enforcement needs.  Id. at 30 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014)).  
Specifically, we explained that where a restriction imposes a significant burden on 
speech, the government must show that it tried or “seriously considered[] substantially 
less restrictive alternatives,” such as arrests or targeted injunctions.  Bruni II, slip op. at 
31.  But where the burden on speech is not significant, “a less demanding inquiry is 
called for.”  Id.  Because the ordinance was limited in scope and size, we concluded that 
the burden on speech was not significant.  Id. at 32–33.  And because Pittsburgh had 
“attempt[ed] or consider[ed] some less burdensome alternatives,” such as the use of an 
overtime police detail and enforcement of existing criminal laws, “and conclud[ed] they 
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were unsuccessful in meeting the legitimate interests at issue,” the city had satisfied its 
corresponding burden.  Id. at 34 (citations omitted).  We therefore held that the ordinance 
was narrowly tailored and survived intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 35–36. 
With this guidance, we now turn to Plaintiffs’ arguments.  
B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments 
First, the District Court did not err by interpreting the Ordinance narrowly to 
exclude sidewalk counseling.  As we explained in Bruni II, the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance counsels that “[i]n the absence of a limiting construction from a state authority, 
we must presume any narrowing construction or practice to which the law is fairly 
susceptible.”  Id. at 22 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 274 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also Saxe v. State 
Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, as in Bruni II, no 
state court has interpreted the Ordinance, and the Ordinance is “fairly susceptible” to a 
narrowing construction that excludes sidewalk counseling from its reach because the 
plain meanings of the words “congregate,” “patrol,” “picket,” and “demonstrate” do not 
cover peaceful one-on-one conversations or leafletting.  Bruni II, slip. op. at 24–26.  The 
District Court therefore did not “rewrit[e]” the Ordinance but simply “reinterpret[ed]” it 
consistent with the plain meaning of its terms.7  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. 
                                                          
7 Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.  That the City asserts 
that the Ordinance covers Plaintiffs’ sidewalk counseling is not dispositive.  See Bruni II, 
slip op. at 22 n.14.  And given that our precedent is clear that a federal court may 
interpret a state statute or municipal ordinance narrowly to avoid constitutional infirmity 
where it is readily susceptible to such an interpretation, see id. at 22–24; Free Speech 
Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 539 (3d Cir. 2012); Brown, 586 F.3d at 
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of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 539 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 
481 (2010)).  
Second, the Ordinance is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.  A law is 
impermissibly vague “if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits” or “authorizes . . . arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”  Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 (citation omitted).  Although 
Plaintiffs are correct that the Ordinance does not provide definitions of the itemized 
activities that are prohibited within the zone, “perfect clarity and precise guidance have 
never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.”  Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989).  And, here, we do have guidance from the 
Supreme Court, which has found words like “demonstrate” not impermissibly vague, 
particularly when viewed in context, see Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383,8 and, as is true of the 
Ordinance, when such words are qualified by a scienter requirement, see Hill, 530 U.S. at 
732–33.  At bottom, Appellants’ vagueness and overbreadth arguments rely on the 
assumption that the Ordinance can be interpreted to cover sidewalk counseling.9  As we 
                                                          
274; Saxe, 240 F.3d at 215–16, 215 n.10, it is of no consequence that some other circuits 
take a contrary approach, Bruni II, slip op. at 22 n.14.  
 
8 Indeed, in Schenck, the Supreme Court “quickly refuted” an argument that the 
term “demonstrating” was vague.  519 U.S. at 383 (“When the injunction is read as a 
whole, we believe that people of ordinary intelligence (and certainly defendants, whose 
demonstrations led to this litigation in the first place) have been given a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).   
 
9 Plaintiffs also argue that the Ordinance is vague “because it does not require 
Defendants to visibly mark the buffer zone boundaries on the sidewalk,” Appellants’ Br. 
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conclude that is not a reasonable reading of the Ordinance’s plain language, see Bruni II, 
slip op. at 28, however, the Ordinance is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.   
Third, the Ordinance is not content based and thus not subject to strict scrutiny.  A 
law is content based if it (1) regulates speech based on “subject matter,” “function,” or 
“purpose”; (2) “cannot be justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech”; or (3) was “adopted by the government because of disagreement with the 
message [the speech] conveys.”  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Plaintiffs argue 
that the Ordinance is content based under each of these tests.  We disagree. 
Plaintiffs first contend that the Ordinance is content based because it regulates 
speech “whose function or purpose is to ‘demonstrate’ or ‘picket’” but not “speech whose 
function or purpose is to communicate something else.”  Appellants’ Br. 44.  But, as we 
explained in Bruni II, “demonstrating” and “picketing,” both of which have obvious 
visible manifestations, go to “the manner in which expressive activity occurs, not its 
content.”  Bruni II, slip op. at 26 (citing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759, 763–64; Snyder, 562 
                                                          
37, and there is some evidence in the record indicating that the lack of clear demarcation 
of the zone has created uncertainty about its bounds.  While we agree with Plaintiffs that 
this raises vagueness concerns, such concerns are ameliorated in large part by the 
Ordinance’s scienter requirement.  See Brown, 586 F.3d at 291 n.34 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. 
at 732).  And, “[a]s always, enforcement requires the exercise of some degree of police 
judgment.”  Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
114 (1972)).  To the extent there remain vagueness concerns, however, we are confident 
that if the District Court determines a remedy is necessary on remand, it could fashion 
one that does not require disposing of the Ordinance in its entirety.  See, e.g., Brown v. 
City of Pittsburgh, No. 06-393, 2010 WL 2207935, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 2010). 
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U.S. at 456; Hill, 530 U.S. at 721; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383–85; and Grace, 461 U.S. at 
181–82).   
Plaintiffs next argue that the Ordinance is content based because it bans “only 
discussions ‘of substance’” and “leafletting about abortion alternatives” in the buffer 
zone, thus requiring law enforcement to examine the content of any speech to determine 
whether it is prohibited within the zone.  Appellants’ Br. 44.  That being so, Plaintiffs 
contend, the Ordinance “cannot be justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech.”  Id. (citation omitted).  But the District Court’s narrow interpretation 
renders this argument moot:  The Ordinance as properly interpreted does not prohibit 
sidewalk counseling—or any other peaceful one-on-one conversations about any subject 
or for any purpose—in the zone.  Therefore, “there is no need for law enforcement ‘to 
examine the content of the message . . . to determine whether a violation has occurred.’”  
Bruni II, slip op. at 28 (omission in original) (quoting McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479)).   
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance is content based because it was 
“enacted . . . to counteract listeners’ reactions to speech,” an impermissibly content-based 
purpose.  Appellants’ Br. 40 (capitalization omitted).  Specifically, they point to three 
statements as evidence of a content-based motive for enacting the Ordinance: a comment 
at a city council hearing calling the legislation necessary to “protect the dignity” of 
patients10; the Ordinance’s description of its “purpose” as assisting police in their 
                                                          
10 Plaintiffs erroneously imply that it was a Planned Parenthood employee who 
made this and other allegedly offending comments.  But “a resident of the neighborhood” 
made these comments.  JA 132. 
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“effort[s] to prevent violent confrontations”; and Defendants’ statement in a brief that 
“Harrisburg determined that it needed a buffer zone as a preventative measure” in part 
because “[s]ometimes, a patient’s loved one would react protectively, escalating the 
situation.”  Appellants’ Br. 41 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).   
None of these statements indicate that the City adopted the Ordinance for an 
impermissibly content-based reason.  To begin with, the interests identified in the 
Ordinance itself—providing “access to health care facilities,” “prevent[ing] violent 
confrontations,” and “protecting the First Amendment rights of demonstrators to 
communicate their message”—are content neutral.  JA 163–64; see McCullen, 573 U.S. 
at 480–81.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has said so repeatedly.  See Bruni II, slip op. at 29 
(citing cases).  Plaintiffs’ attempt to transform the content-neutral goal of “prevent[ing] 
violent confrontations”—and the related goal of de-escalating tense situations—into a 
content-based restriction akin to a heckler’s veto is unavailing: “[a] regulation that serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an 
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”11  McCullen, 573 U.S. at 
480 (alteration in original) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791); see Startzell v. City of 
Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (distinguishing a “heckler’s veto,” which 
                                                          
11 Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the Ordinance does not 
impermissibly regulate the “undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of 
speech on its audience’ or ‘listeners’ reactions to speech,’” because “[w]hether or not a 
single person reacts to abortion protesters’ chants or petitioners’ counseling, large crowds 
outside abortion clinics can still compromise public safety, impede access, and obstruct 
sidewalks.”  McCullen, 573 U.S. at 481 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 
(1988)).  
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is an “impermissible content-based restriction on speech where the speech is prohibited 
due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the audience,” from a “content-
neutral time, place, or manner restriction”).  And as for the allegedly offending stray 
comment, it is irrelevant because the individual resident who uttered it does not speak for 
the City.  We therefore agree with the District Court that the Ordinance is content neutral.    
Fourth, the Ordinance is narrowly tailored and therefore survives intermediate 
scrutiny.  To be narrowly tailored, a regulation must not “burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”  McCullen, 573 
U.S. at 486 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).  As was true in Bruni II, the Ordinance, as 
properly interpreted, does not impose a significant burden on speech.  The scope of 
prohibited expressive activities is identical to that in Bruni II and the fact that the buffer 
zone is five feet larger than the zone in Bruni II is not enough to render the burden on 
speech significant.  See Bruni II, slip op. at 30 (“[W]e afford[] some deference to a 
municipality’s judgment in adopting a content-neutral restriction on speech.” (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted)).  Indeed, the buffer zone is significantly smaller 
than the thirty-five-foot zone in McCullen that was not narrowly tailored because, among 
other things, it “carve[d] out a significant portion of the adjacent public sidewalks, 
pushing petitioners well back from the clinic’s entrances and driveways.” 573 U.S. at 
487.   
Also, as in Bruni II, Harrisburg did not “resort[] to a fixed buffer zone . . . in the 
first instance” but “attempt[ed] or consider[ed] some less burdensome alternatives and 
15 
 
conclud[ed] they were unsuccessful in meeting the legitimate interests at issue.”12  Bruni 
II, slip op. at 34.  At the hearing on the preliminary injunction, a councilperson testified 
that existing criminal laws prohibiting trespassing, excessive noise, and disorderly 
conduct were insufficient to keep protests under control before the Ordinance’s 
enactment.  This was in large part due to the City’s inability to expend police resources to 
enforce these laws because of the City’s grave financial situation:  As the former special 
counsel to the Harrisburg City Council explained, with over 300 million dollars in debt, 
the City was placed under receivership status and could afford neither to hire additional 
police officers nor to pay officers overtime to patrol the clinics.13  See Turco v. City of 
                                                          
12 Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have not carried their burden because 
“Defendants’ entire ‘meaningful record’ of what they considered prior to enacting the 
Ordinance consists of the 12-page transcript of the only council meeting where the 
Ordinance was substantively discussed” and that record was “devoid of any serious 
consideration of less restrictive alternatives.”  Appellants’ Br. 52.  But we agree with the 
District Court that a local government is not required to “produce all available evidence 
and consider alternatives at a single, recorded hearing before taking action.”  Reilly, 336 
F. Supp. 3d at 466.  Even when a burden on speech is significant, all that our precedent 
requires is that “substantially less-restrictive alternatives were tried and failed, or that the 
alternatives were closely examined and ruled out,” Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh (Bruni I), 
824 F.3d 353, 370 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted), not that the only evidence a court can 
consider in determining whether the government has satisfied its burden must be derived 
from a committee council hearing that was recorded.  More importantly, the burden here 
is not significant, so the City need only show that the restriction did not “burden[] 
substantially more speech than . . . necessary to further the government’s legitimate 
interests.”  Bruni II, slip op. at 35 (quoting McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486).  Through 
declarations, documentary evidence, and in-court testimony, Defendants have done so. 
 
13 The City also decreased police benefits, causing officers to leave the force and 
fewer to join, at times leaving only four to eight police officers to patrol the City—a 
consequence the effects of which Harrisburg continues to feel to this day.  Plaintiffs 
suggest that the City’s financial woes could not have been as bad as Defendants say—and 
as the District Court found—because Harrisburg’s Chief of Police said during the same 
hearing at which the Ordinance was discussed that he would “step up enforcement of the 
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Englewood, 935 F.3d 155, 167, 169 (3d Cir. 2019) (recognizing relevance of a city’s 
“financial restraints” and police department’s “finite resources” in the narrow tailoring 
analysis).  The record also demonstrates that Harrisburg considered differently sized 
zones and, based on the competing interests at stake, settled on twenty feet as the optimal 
size, rejecting Planned Parenthood’s request for a twenty-four-foot zone.  Thus, given 
that the burden the Ordinance imposes on speech is not significant and the City has 
demonstrated that it tried or considered some less-restrictive alternatives, we conclude 
that the Ordinance is narrowly tailored and survives intermediate scrutiny.  That being so, 
Plaintiffs do not have a “reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation,” 
Reilly I, 858 F.3d at 176 (citation omitted), and the District Court therefore did not err in 
denying their motion for a preliminary injunction.14   
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
                                                          
City’s noise and trash ordinances.”  Appellants’ Br. 57.  But the Police Chief’s testimony 
merely reflects in context that councilmembers were not pleased that those ordinances 
were not adequately being enforced—no doubt due at least in part to scarce resources—
and that the Police Chief would try to address their concerns going forward.  His offer to 
“help . . . out” the City’s code enforcement division while its leader was having personal 
difficulties, JA 572, also does not demonstrate that there were resources available to 
station officers outside the City’s reproductive health facilities on a continuous basis.   
 
14 We recognize that the City could have a legitimate concern about access to 
healthcare facilities if there are multiple one-on-one conversations that block access to 
the facilities.  See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486–87.  The City may then have occasion to 
revisit the terms of the Ordinance, having developed a record that would satisfy 
McCullen and Bruni I, as well as the content-neutrality requirement of Reed.  See Turco, 
935 F.3d at 162–63. 
  
